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A key question in the Fiscal Federalism literature is whether decentralized policymaking
in an economy with spillovers among jurisdictions leads to an ecient outcome (see e.g.
Oates, 1974). A striking example where this question is of particular importance is the
current debate on global warming. The failure of the Copenhagen Summit in late 2009
has impressively shown that centralized solutions to the climate change problem are hardly
realizable. One might thus want to know whether a decentralized policy approach, where
each country chooses its own climate policy without coordinating it with the climate policy
of other countries, gives hope for an ecient policy outcome. Further important examples
of decentralized decision making in the presence of interjurisdictional spillover eects can
be found in the decentralized provision of education and infrastructure.
At rst glance, it is hardly imaginable that decentralized policymaking can ever be
optimal. It is not only the very existence of spillovers which causes doubt. Also the policy
instruments themselves create (policy) externalities on other jurisdictions. Despite this
presumption against the eciency of decentralized policymaking, the previous literature
provides several studies in which decentralization leads to an undistorted policy choice. An
important example is given by Oates and Schwab (1988) who argue that the choice of capital
tax rates in an economy with identical jurisdictions, mobile capital and local pollution may
indeed be ecient. In a remarkable current paper, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) extend the
analysis to account for transboundary pollution (spillovers) and asymmetric countries, and
still get the eciency result. In their model emissions and, thus, the extent of spillovers
generated by a jurisdiction is proportional to capital employed in this jurisdiction. The
choice of capital tax rates is then distorted by the jurisdictions' incentive for tax competition
and by the jurisdictions' ignorance of spillover eects. But the key argument is that both
distortions just neutralize each other and thereby lead to ecient capital tax rates.
Our paper contributes to this literature and points to the important role which the
elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays
for the eciency of decentralized policymaking. In accordance with the previous literature,
we show that under a xed capital supply (zero capital supply elasticity) the decentralized
policy choice is indeed optimal. If the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive, however,
capital tax rates are ineciently low in the decentralized equilibrium. The rationale is that,
with a positive capital supply elasticity, a capital tax rate increase in one jurisdiction lowers
1the net return to capital and, thus, aggregate capital supply as well as total emissions in
the whole economy. For that reason the distortion of capital taxes due to the environmental
spillover eects is smaller than in case with xed capital supply and no longer large enough
to compensate the distortion due to the tax competition incentive of the jurisdictions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model assumption.
In Section 3 we characterize the eciency properties of decentralized policymaking, and
Section 4 briey concludes by discussing the relevance of a positive capital supply elasticity.
2 Model
Firms. We use a simplied version of the Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) model1 and extend
it to appropriately deal with elastic capital supply. Consider an economy with n jurisdic-
tions. Jurisdiction indices are i;j 2 f1;:::;ng with i 6= j. In jurisdiction i there is a
representative rm that employs ki units of capital in order to produce F(ki) units of an
output good whose price is normalized to one. The production function is increasing and
concave, i.e. F 0 > 0 and F 00 < 0. Each unit of capital is rented on the economy-wide capital
market at the net return to capital denoted by  > 0. Since jurisdiction i levies a unit tax
on capital at rate ti, after-tax prot of the rm located in jurisdiction i reads
i = F(ki)   ( + ti)ki: (1)
The rst-order condition of prot maximization is
F
0(ki)   ti = : (2)
It equalizes the after-tax return to capital across countries.
Households. Each jurisdictions is populated by a representative household who lives for
two periods. In the rst period, jurisdiction i's resident has an endowment  k of rst period
income that can either be spent for rst-period consumption at rate x1
i or saved at rate
si =  k   x1
i. In the second period, the resident receives capital income (1 + )si and prot
income i earned in her jurisdiction, less a lump sum tax i levied by jurisdiction i. The
1The simplication is that we focus on the case of perfectly symmetric countries, while the analysis of
Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) allows for country asymmetries. Abstracting from such asymmetries is suitable
for our purposes since we are interested in the role of the capital supply elasticity.
2second-period budget is x2
i = (1+)si+i i where x2
i denotes second-period consumption.
Beside private consumption, utility of jurisdiction i's resident is aected by the quantity gi





i + V (gi;ei) = U( k   si) + (1 + )si + i   i + V (gi;ei): (3)
The subutility functions U and V are assumed to be concave and satisfy U0 > 0, Vg > 0
and Ve < 0. Maximizing utility (3) with respect to savings si gives U0( k   si)   1    = 0.
This condition determines savings as a function of the interest rate , i.e. si = S(). The
derivative S0() =  1=U00 > 0 serves as approximation for the capital supply elasticity
" := S0=S. For notational convenience, we do not replace S0 by an expression containing
", but instead use S0 to distinguish the case of a positive elasticity (S0 > 0 and " > 0) from
the case of a zero elasticity, which is obtained by setting S0  "  0.
Capital Market. Capital is perfectly mobile. On the economy-wide capital market,
capital demand of rms meets capital supply of households. The equilibrium condition is
n X
i=1
ki = nS(): (4)
Equations (2) and (4) determine the equilibrium capital allocation fkign
i=1 and the net
return to capital  as functions of the tax rates ftign
i=1. Totally dierentiating and then










n   1   nF 00S0





n(1   F 00S0)F 00 > 0; (5)
@ki
@ti





1   F 00S0 < 0: (6)
As shown in (5), a unilateral increase in one jurisdiction's capital tax rate reduces investment
in that jurisdiction and increases investment in all other jurisdictions via a decline in the
net return to capital. The decisive dierence of our approach to the case with xed capital
supply is that, according to (6), the increase in one jurisdiction's tax rate lowers total
capital supply and, thus, total investment. Investment in the tax-increasing jurisdiction
therefore falls by more than it does in the presence of a xed capital supply. Formally, this
is represented by the additional term  nF 00S0 in the numerator of @ki=@ti in equation (5).
Emissions. Each unit of capital employed in jurisdiction i generates  > 0 units of
emissions in jurisdiction i and  units of emissions in jurisdiction j. The parameter
3 2 [0;1] reects the degree of interjurisdictional spillovers. In case of  = 0 we have
local pollution, while  > 0 reects transboundary pollution. The extreme case of  = 1
approximates global pollution since each unit of emissions causes the same pollution in all
jurisdictions. Total pollution in jurisdiction i is given by








[(1   )(n   1)   nF 00S0]




[   1   nF 00S0]
n(1   F 00S0)F 00 T 0; (8)
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@ti




[1 + (n   1)]S0
1   F 00S0 < 0: (9)
A tax rate increase in jurisdiction i induces a relocation of capital and, thus, emissions from
jurisdiction i to all other jurisdictions. As a consequence, pollution in jurisdiction i falls if
the 'spill back' eect is not perfect, i.e. pollution is not global ( 2 [0;1[). Moreover, the
increase in jurisdiction i's tax rate reduces total capital supply and thereby total emissions
according to (9). Hence, as shown by (8), pollution in jurisdiction i falls upon a tax rate
increase in jurisdiction i, even if pollution is global ( = 1). This property is an important
dierence to the world with xed capital supply (S0  0). It also explains why, according to
(8), the eect of jurisdiction i's tax rate on pollution in jurisdiction j is ambiguous. With a
xed capital supply (S0  0), the relocation of capital and emissions raises (if  2 [0;1[) or
leaves unchanged (if  = 1) pollution in jurisdiction j. However, if capital supply is elastic
(S0 > 0) and if the spillovers are strictly positive ( 2]0;1]), jurisdiction j benets from
the additional reduction in investment and emissions in the tax-increasing jurisdiction i.
Formally, this eect is reected by  nF 00S0 in the numerator of @ej=@ti in equation (8).
Put dierently, the more elastic capital supply, the lower is ceteris paribus the increase of
pollution in jurisdiction j upon a tax rate increase in jurisdiction i. This eect will turn
out to be the driving force behind our main insights derived below.
Governments. The government of jurisdiction i chooses the lump sum tax i and the
capital tax ti in order to maximize its resident's welfare (3). In so doing, it takes into
account si = S(), (1), (2) and (4){(9). Moreover, it is restricted by the budget constraint
gi = tiki + i; (10)
4where we assumed that the output of rms can be transformed one-to-one into the public
good. Each government treats the policy variables of the other governments as given, so
we consider a Nash policy game in the lump sum tax and the capital tax.
3 Decentralized Equilibrium
Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium with i =  and ti = t, the rst-order conditions
of jurisdiction i's welfare maximization are dui=di = 0 and dui=dti = 0 or, equivalently
Vg = 1; t
 =  
[(1   )(n   1)   nF 00S0]Ve
n   1   nF 00S0 : (11)
The rst condition in (11) shows that the lump sum tax is set such that the Samuelson
condition for the optimal provision of public goods is satised. The second condition gives
the equilibrium capital tax rate, which deviates from the full marginal damage a unit of
emissions causes in the whole economy, i.e. t 6=  [1+(n 1)]Ve. This deviation is true
independent of whether we consider xed or elastic capital supply.
To assess the eciency properties of the Nash equilibrium we determine the policy
externalities, i.e. the eect of jurisdiction i's tax rate on welfare in jurisdiction j. If the
externality is positive (negative), then starting from the symmetric Nash equilibrium and
marginally increasing the tax rates of all jurisdictions by the same amount leads to a Pareto
improvement (deterioration) and, thus, the tax rates are ineciently low (high). For a zero
externality, the Nash equilibrium is ecient. Dierentiating uj from (3) with respect to i

















(   1   nF 00S0)Ve
n(1   F 00S0)F 00 : (13)
According to (12), the equilibrium lump sum tax is ecient since the associated externality
is zero. This is consistent with the Samuelson rule in (11). The cross-jurisdictional eect
of the capital tax rate can be decomposed into two subexternalities. When jurisdiction i
raises its capital tax rate, it does not take into account that capital ights out and thereby
improves the tax base and public goods provision in jurisdiction j. This eect is reected by
the scal externality FE which is positive and points to ineciently low tax rates. Second, if
5jurisdiction i raises its capital tax rate, the associated relocation of capital changes pollution
in jurisdiction j. This eect is captured by the environmental externality EE. Since @ej=@ti
from (8) is ambiguous, the environmental externality is indeterminate in sign.
The decisive question is whether the sum of externalities is positive, negative or zero.
Adding FE and EE and using the equilibrium conditions (11) yields
duj
dti
= FE + EE =  
nS0Ve
n   1   nF 00S0: (14)
From expression (14) we immediately obtain the following
Proposition. Suppose the Nash policy game attains a symmetric equilibrium and pollu-
tion is transboundary, i.e.  2]0;1]. If capital supply is xed (S0  0), then the equilibrium
capital tax rate t is ecient. In contrast, if capital supply is elastic (S0 > 0), then the
equilibrium capital tax rate t is ineciently low.
The rst part of the Proposition replicates the eciency result of Ogawa and Wildasin
(2009). It is a remarkable result since, with mobile capital, the tax competition incentive
of jurisdictions actually distorts the capital tax rate downwards. In the presence of in-
terjurisdictional spillovers, however, the capital tax rate is distorted for a second reason.
Each jurisdiction does not fully internalize the economy-wide environmental damage caused
by its rm (remember t from (11)). The important contribution of Ogawa and Wildasin
(2009) is to show that both distortions just neutralize each other, so equilibrium capital
tax rates are ecient. In terms of externalities, with xed capital supply the environmental
externality EE is negative and just outweighs the positive scal externality FE.
The contribution of our analysis is the second part of the Proposition, which shows
that with elastic capital supply the eciency result does not longer hold. The driving
force behind this result is the impact of the capital supply elasticity (approximated by S0)
on pollution. As argued in the discussion of (8), the larger the capital supply elasticity,
the lower is the increase in jurisdiction j's pollution upon an increase in jurisdiction i's
capital tax rate and, thus, the smaller is the distortion of the capital tax rate due to the
ignored environmental spillover eects. Hence, if the capital supply elasticity is positive,
the environmental distortion is no longer large enough to compensate the tax competition
distortion. Put dierently, with a positive capital supply elasticity the environmental exter-
nality EE in (13) is smaller in absolute terms than the scal externality FE in (13), hence
the equilibrium capital tax rates become ineciently low.
6Two remarks are in order. First, it is the interaction of the positive capital supply
elasticity (S0 > 0) and the existence of spillovers ( 2]0;1]) which causes the ineciency.
With local pollution ( = 0), the equilibrium capital tax rate is ecient even if capital
supply is elastic. The reason why we need strictly positive spillovers is that the reduction
of pollution in jurisdiction j, which causes the decisive decrease in the environmental ex-
ternality, comes from the negative eect of the capital supply elasticity on investment and
emissions in jurisdiction i, and this eect translates into a fall of pollution in jurisdiction
j only if spillovers are strictly positive. Remember our discussion of equation (8). Second,
an increase in the number of jurisdictions tends to aggravate the distortion of capital tax
rates. From (14) we see that the policy externality which jurisdiction i inicts on one single
other jurisdiction becomes smaller as n increases. But the number of jurisdictions which
are harmed by the ignorance of jurisdiction i increases. Hence, decisive is the sum of exter-
nalities inicted on all other jurisdictions, (n   1)(@uj=@ti), and this sum is increasing in
n. Roughly speaking, in economies with many relatively small jurisdictions the ineciency
therefore tends to be more severe than in economies with few relatively large jurisdictions.
4 Relevance
The assumption of a positive capital supply elasticity has intensively been used in the
theoretical literature. An important example is the analysis of Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2002) who point out that the relation of horizontal and vertical scal externalities in
federal states crucially depends on the capital supply elasticity. Empirically, the evidence
is mixed. A much-cited estimate for the capital supply elasticity is 0.4 found by Boskin
(1978). Bernheim (2002) argues that the estimates range from values close to zero up to
0.4, whereas Gylfason (1993) reports estimated values signicantly larger than one. Taking
this mixed observations literally, our analysis can best be understood as complementing the
previous literature. While the eciency result of e.g. Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) is relevant
for all economies where the capital supply elasticity has been found to be negligible, our
analysis suggests that for economies with signicantly positive capital supply elasticities it
cannot be expected that decentralized policymaking yields an ecient outcome.
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